How is property geographical? The making of liberal property, I argue, relies upon a topographical logic, premised on the production of bounded, coherent spaces, through which the individuated subjects and objects of property can be rendered legible. Such a spatialization helps sustain the territorialization of property, in which the government of space becomes a means for the enactment of property. The production of such spaces requires conscious 'cuts' in the processual networks through which social spaces are produced. As such, property should be seen as a conditional achievement, ever threatened by unwanted relationality and boundary crossing. I draw from Kate Grenville's novel The Secret River to explore property's spaces, and their ambivalent ethical and practical work.
1
In the early years of the nineteenth century, William Thornhill, an ex-convict transported to Australia, took possession of a piece of land through an almost alchemical act:
In the centre of the clearing he dragged his heel across the dirt four times, line to line. The straight lines and the square they made were like nothing else and changed everything. Now there was a place where a man had laid his mark over the face of the earth. It was astonishing how little it took to own a piece of land. 2 The quotation comes from Kate Grenville's novel, The Secret River. Prompted by a desire to reflect on her own ancestor's experiences, Grenville traces the transportation of Thornhill, a Thames waterman, and his wife, Sal, from London to the new British colony in Sydney in the early years of the nineteenth century. In time, Thornhill secures his freedom, and settles on land on the outlying Hawkesbury River with his family. They soon discover that what appeared to be empty land, there for the taking, is occupied and used by Aboriginal people. Negotiating this fraught relationship is at the core of the novel: the quid pro quo approach of some settlers is overshadowed by a virulent and aggressive claim to absolute ownership by others, whereby Aborigines are cast as interlopers, and are to be dealt with summarily. Thornhill is torn: he attempts to communicate with his aboriginal neighbors, but is also beset by fear and paranoia. Tensions build, before the pervasive undercurrent of violence erupts in a massacre, in which Thornhill reluctantly participates.
Grenville's novel has been the subject of some debate concerning its historiography, as well as its place in the postcolonial Australian present.
3 Nevertheless, it is useful for my purposes in that it offers a richly geographic account of the spaces, territories and places of property. My concern is less with the colonial context, important though that is, than with the ways in which the novel, set at the raw and ragged edges of empire, forces the all-too often implicit or unconsidered geographies of Western property 4 to the fore. It is in considering the spaces of property, I hope, that the article makes a useful contribution.
But how are we to think of space? The tendency is to draw from a particular and remarkably pervasive reading. We moderns are predisposed to think of space in a particular way that we can term topographical or Euclidean. Space, on this view, is a stable set of coordinates, detached from social and political processes. As such, space appears as a series of containers or bounded zones, the specification of which reflects inherent or natural modes of ordering. So, for example, ''place'' is seen as a neutral or a priori category, understood as a contained zone. 5 This contrasts with an alternative view of space as relational, produced through diverse, networked processes. 6 Space, on this view, is not ''outside'' social and political life, but folded into and produced through forms of interaction and relationality. Space, then, is always in the process of becoming, as relations unfold. It is not a container, but rather is contained in networks. It is not a coherent system of discriminations and categorizations, but is itself expressive of multiplicity and flow. 7 As I have argued elsewhere, space is implicated in the enactments, politics and enforcement of property. 8 But space, in both the Euclidean and relational sense, may be at issue in a more fundamental sense. As space is a means by which we order the world into near and far, higher and lower and so on, 9 so property can be said to depend on a geographic logic. The root of the word property, proprius, probably has an Indo-European root that means, broadly, ''in front of,'' ''before,'' ''close to'' and ''on behalf of'':
… [E]ven before it comes to be a legal term ''property'' is an abstraction of the idea of what distinguishes an individual or a thing from a group or from another. It is the face of one to other(s), what separates me from thee and ye, what lies in a person's view, what has priority in time. 10 Property, at its very core, then, seems to entails boundary-work, in which both bounded and relational spaces are at work. This is perhaps even more acute when it comes to liberal conceptions of property. While these have a taken-for-granted quality, it is vital that we hold them up carefully to view, in order to acknowledge their particularity and strangeness.
Important for my purposes is the way our conceptions of property are premised on the drawing of bright lines, marking off one individual interest or estate from another. At work here is a particularly sharp logic of Euclidean spatialization, in which categories are detached, bounded and contained, and imagined as individuated spaces. The production of property thus requires categorical cuts, in which ''belonging is … given a boundary.'' 11 . Such cuts take at least two inter-related forms. Most immediately, the production and extension of liberal property entails the conversion of a network of social relationships into a set of discrete, bounded things. 12 The objects of property, in other words, become imagined as separate spaces. The production of property entails a process of pulverization whereby units (such as fish, ideas, genome, or land) are identified, bounded and detached, and thus rendered legible and actionable. 13 This is particularly the case in the production of liberal real property, which saw the conceptual conversion of property into bounded parcels of land, from which others were to be excluded, rather than as conditional tenures, caught up in relational networks. 14 Secondly, liberal property entails the spatial circumscription of the subject-owner. The possessive individual is individuated, imagined as a presocial, autonomous and distinctive subject, protected from others by the shield of rights. 15 Property thus becomes a boundary marking off the legal subject. It is no accident that property talk is replete with spatial metaphors when it comes to describe the individuated legal subject. Property, notes Reich, ''draws a circle'' around the individual, within which ''he is master.'' 16 The law imagines its role as both a marker and guardian of the boundary: Thus a judge in an early-eighteenth century case in England offered the comforting maxim that ''the law bounds everyman's property and is his fence. '' 17 To spatialize the self is not only to constitute subjectivity in particular ways. It also shapes ethical deliberation and engagement with others, as the metaphors of ''distant strangers'' and those ''nearest and dearest'' hint at. 18 The drawing of metaphoric boundaries invites an ethic of entitlement, rather than one of obligation, exemplified by the small-minded neighbor who ''moves in darkness,'' in Robert Frost's poem ''Mending Wall.'' 19 As a consequence, it becomes easier to view the native homeless person outside my gate as a threat to my property, rather than someone whose very location is a product of my own good fortune. Imagined thus, the solution to his or her troubling presence is some form of removal. This is an estranged world in which we interact through our property, rather than as social beings: ''the only comprehensible language we have is the language our possessions use together. '' 20 But the cuts that spatialize the self and the objects of property are not easily made. To draw and to maintain any boundary, whether metaphoric or real, requires considerable investments of energy and time, precisely because of the simultaneous relationality of space. Cuts in networks of identity and matter have to be secured and hybridization guarded against. To cut, in other words, is to be engaged in ''a process of carving out 'permanences' from the flow of processes creating spaces. But the 'permanences' -no matter how solid they may seem -are not eternal … They are contingent on the processes that create, sustain and dissolve them. '' 21 Severing the self, for example, requires sustained work. Prudham's discussion of the struggle to ring-fence the legal category of the ''autonomous invention,'' where intellectual property is imagined as the product of a singular author (and hence, owner), and detach it from prior social and biophysical contributions is illustrative. Is an ''oncomouse'' a product of human intervention, or of nature? 22 To say that I am the author of this paper similarly requires me (practically, and ethically) to deny the multiple intellectual debts that it owes, never mind the biophysical, emotional, financial and material contexts that shaped it.
As noted, property also requires the individuation of the ''things'' of property, entailing ''a discursive and practical 'cut' into the seamless complexity of the world in order to name discrete 'noun-chunks' of reality that are deemed to be socially useful. '' 23 But producing such ''chunks'' is far from easy. 24 Emergent markets in Water Quality Trading, for example, struggle to fix and bound properties that can be acquired and traded. 25 The durability of such ''cuts'' is everywhere challenged by the presence of relations and associations. The individuated subject and object are threatened by forms of hybridization. Property law and practice is often concerned with maintaining the purity of these categories in the face of dissolution. It is this relationship (between container and boundary-crossing, between permanence and change, between cut and flow) that offers one potentially useful way to think about the workings of property. 26 Such dynamics are not, clearly, exclusively geographic. However, property does seem to have a particularly important relationship to spatial cuts and flows.
We may be tempted to dwell on the impermanence and fragility of the spaces of property. To do so, however, is to overlook the ways such ''cuts'' organize and constitute the world in particular ways, becoming stabilized and sedimented, thus rendering durable and visible the social relations and exclusions constituted through property.
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The ''power'' of such configurations reflects partly their reliance upon the apparent passivity of space (imagined as the dead and the inert) such that it is not power that appears to be at work, but the space itself. But they also derive practical power from their insertion in other networks of power, themselves spatially distributed and organized. For as individuated ''containers,'' the subject and object of property are not detached. Indeed, they are meaningless unless put into circulation in networks of administration, enforcement and commodification, the effects of which are to enroll and concentrate the resources of power. The objects of property, for example, are inserted into networks of record keeping, registration and commerce. As such, they are clearly ''relational'' spaces. However, their success in such networks depends on the degree to which they retain their individuated form. Owners and objects must remain determinate, legible and coherent.
28
Particular forms of spatialization of the subjects and objects of property, therefore, may serve to position them in distributed networks of power. But the cuts of property may themselves be materialized in particular spaces that seek to govern others through the government of space, a shorthand for which is territorialization. Territorialization is closely related to spatialization, but not reducible to it. One can spatialize, for example, without seeking to govern others. By territoriality, I mean the attempt to control people, phenomena or relationships by delimiting and asserting control over space. In that sense, territorialization may entail the enforcement of spatialization.
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Defined thus, territoriality could be construed in many ways. Although Sack views it in relation to defined ''territories,'' we could also imagine overlapping, mobile, or striated forms of territoriality, like Aboriginal song-lines.
30 But property's territorialization is a zero-sum form of classification, reliant upon a binary, zero-sum categorical logic. Hence the bizarre notion of ''trespass'' (from the Latin ''trans,'' across, and ''passus,'' step) in which mere physical presence, even absent any damage to a resource, constitutes an offence. The object of property is compromised to the extent that its space is violated. And, of course, this is not simply an assault upon the object of property, but is seen as a violation of the ''personal space'' of the owner herself. To the degree that territorialization can be actually enforced, it becomes an expression of power-geometry: people are differently placed in relation to the spaces of property, and the processes and social resources that they are constituted by. 31
Cuts: Making space and property in The Secret River
Property does not simply regulate the relationships between objects and subjects but is ''constitutive of the division in the socio-material fabric of worldly associations that brings things and persons into being in particular ways,'' 32 Grenville's novel speaks to
28. An interesting example of this is provided by the history of land surveying, in which the universalized rules of geometry and mathematics were deployed not only so as to convert relations into static spaces, but also to ensure that such spaces could become interchangeable, plugged into non-local market networks that required comparison and distanced evaluation. the production of such divisions, yet is attentive to their unraveling and relationality. The spaces of property appear as shaped by both cut and flow, in other words. Yet such spaces constitute relations between settlers and the original occupants according to an exclusionary and, ultimately, murderous logic.
The significance of the cuts of property is made clear as soon as Thornhill arrives in the new colony. 33 He brings with him a spatialized reading of property, as a series of separable parcels that are to be territorialized in particular ways. Such a spatialization is seen as a precondition for property. At such, the original occupants of the land are characterized as clearly incapable of property, given their mobile and apparently unsettled geographies. In particular, they do not spatialize property in ways that are legible to an English legal mentality:
There were no signs that the blacks felt the place belonged to them. They had no fences that said this is mine. No home that said, this is our home. There were no fields or flocks that said, we have put the labour of our hands into this place. 34 Thornhill, conversely, reads his environment, and operates within it, according to these propertied spatial cues. At the outset, the land is without distinction, ''a woolly forest … uniform as fabric. '' 35 Applying these visualized grids is one means by which the alien world in which he finds himself (in which ''everywhere was the same but everywhere was different'' 36 ) can be made legible, and transformed into actionable and meaningful units.
Thornhill comes to crave property, seeking ''[t]o say mine, in a way he had never been able to say mine of anything at all.'' 37 To say ''mine,'' in other words, is to reconstitute himself as an autonomous subject, capable of exercising dominion, rather than being the object of another's power. The spatialized enactments of labor noted by Thornhillthe creation of fences, homes and the application of labor -are significant given that land is free for the taking for those who are able to turn property into space and territory in culturally prescribed ways: All a settler had to do ''was find a place no one had already taken. Plant a crop, build a hut, call the place Smith's or Flanagan's, and out-stare anyone who said otherwise. '' 38 So Thornhill seizes upon a parcel of land by the Hawkesbury River, and enacts property through a series of cuts and marks, dragging his heel across the dirt, for 33 . In truth, the cuts of property are at work earlier on, in the descriptions of Thornhill's life in London. As a non-owner, in a realm almost of ''no-property'' (J.B. Baron, ''Homelessness as a property problem,'' Urban Lawyer, 36, 2, (2004) 273-88) he succumbs to the temptation to take other's property. The logic of the criminal law -with all its attendant categorical slices of reality -is mobilized, and he is sentenced to death (the most profound of property's cuts, perhaps example, as described at the outset of this article. Such enactments are a means by which Thornhill attempts to carve out a space from ''wilderness'' that he can identify as an object of property. In so doing, he hopes to reassure himself of the stability and coherence of his claim in this vast and empty land, and thus appropriate it to himself, linking subject and object.
Yet, however apparently powerful, such cuts prove fragile and uncertain. They do not necessarily convert land into property. For the incised spaces of property are not always securely attached to the land: so, in one arresting moment, the settlement of Sydney, ''a raw scraped little place,'' 39 is described as provisional and uncertain, having: ''an odd unattached look, the bits of ground cut up into squares in this big loose landscape, a broken-off chip of England resting on the surface of the place. '' 40 He hopes that the creation of a hut and a fence will provide visual reassurance of his title, through an ordering and domestication of an otherwise uncertain and un-named space. Thus, ''he loved the thing a fence did to a place. The tidy square of ground inside a fence had a different look from the ground inside it.'' 41 Similarly, the building of a hut signals not only occupation and title to others, but provides a space for detached visual appropriation:
The air was different inside the hut. Outside, the ceaseless hummings and clickings of the place closed around a speck of human life like water around a pebble. But once there was a hut to go into, a person became again a thing separate from the place. Outside the eye was confused by many details, every leaf and grass-stalk different but each one the same. Framed by doorway or window hole, the forest became something that could be looked at part by part and named. Branch. Leaves. Grass.
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The spatialization produced by the hut allows for ordered differentiation. The forest can be appropriated ''part by part and named,'' and a person can become a ''thing separate from the place.'' As such, the forest becomes a categorical and severable object of property. However, it is soon clear that the ''distinction between inside and outside was not as clear as he had hoped.'' 43 The outside -the animals, the sounds of Aborigines, the fear and the paranoia -still leak through its flimsy walls. Snakes pass through the walls of the hut, and the forest and its occupants press in upon his fence: ''Beyond the patch of bare earth he was so proud of, the river-oaks hissed and gumtrees rattled and scraped the way they always had.'' 44 As he views his land from the river, on a return trip to Sydney, he reflects on its vulnerability, with his hut ''hardly visible in its patch of beaten ground. ' 
II. Cuts: Making territory
To create property is not only to create space, but also to produce territory. Thornhill clearly thinks of the land he occupies as his, from which others are to be excluded, or admitted on his own terms. His spatial markers -hut, cleared land, fences -are meant to signal title to others. In that sense, space is also territorialized, becoming a zone from which others are to be excluded. However, it proves hard to detach the space from prior patterns of use and flow.
The failed territorializations of property are a constant theme. Thornhill and his neighbors encounter Aboriginal people who move with indifference across the supposedly bright lines of property. 46 Colonial ''cuts'' do not efface prior patterns of use. The pure spaces of individual possession are sullied by co-presence and overlap. As such, far from providing certainty and security, property's spaces appear vulnerable and under threat. Such ''trespasses'' are seen, of course, as assaults and incursions to both the objects and subjects of property.
The negotiation or enforcement of territory is a central preoccupation of the settlers. Some are aggressively hostile to the Aborigines, treating their presence and movements as incursions and encroachments, the solution to which must be violence and, as we will see, extirpation. Others are more conciliatory, adopting a ''live and let live'' approach, in which settler and indigene territories may coexist or even overlap. 47 Property's territories, in other words, are a basis for either division or engagement.
Thornhill, in particular, is characterized as torn between these competing logics of cut and flow. This tension is manifested early on, when Thornhill clears a patch of land in what he hopes is a potent spatialization of property: ''[i]t was not so much a crop he was aiming for, as a message. Like hoisting a flag on a pole.'' 48 But to his dismay, he sees that someone else had planted daisy yams in land he regards as his own, and pulls the plants up. But just before planting his corn, he realizes that he is being watched by two Aboriginal men. 49 Immediately, the meanings and spaces of property are, literally, in the 46. A comparable novel by David Malouf has an Australian settler complaining of a similar failure of spatialization, as well as signaling some of the challenges of networking the various spaces of property, when he reflects upon the ''tribes of wandering myalls who, in their traipsing this way and that over the map, were forever encroaching on boundaries that could be insisted on by daylight -a good shotgun saw to that -but in the dark hours, when you no longer stood there as a living marker with all the glow of the white man's authority about you, reverted to being a creek-bed or ridge of granite like any other, and gave no indication that six hundred miles away, in the Lands Office in Brisbane, this bit of country had a name set against it on a numbered document, and a line drawn that was empowered with all the authority of the Law'' (D. As matters escalate, Thornhill strikes one of the men. His partner responds by returning the blows, signaling that Thornhill is to leave, before the two men return to the forest. Territory, here and elsewhere, appears to be enacted through a mixture of words, signs and force. As Thornhill notes: ''They got their place, we got ours … We don't give them no grief. Plus they know we got the gun.'' 51 However, such communications are also fraught with ambiguity and miscommunication. At a later encounter, Thornhill decides that a ''line had to be drawn with the blacks'' 52 and attempts to enter into negotiations over property. Some resolution is reached, but Thornhill is unsure precisely what: ''[a] conversation had taken place. There had been an inquiry and an answer. But what inquiry, which answer? They stared at each other, their words between them like a wall. '' 53 Territory shares etymological roots not only with terra, or land, but also terror (terrere). Ultimately, a zero-sum logic of settler territory generates an economy of annihilation. Settler violences, in other words, are predicated on a spatial and territorial logic. 54 While Aboriginal territoriality can create fear, and deliver violence, settler territoriality is differently networked, hooked up to more durable and powerful chains of law and power. The final solution to the continued trespasses of the Aborigines is to remove their ungovernable bodies from the space through violent enforcement. Yet, even here, while territory requires removal, its spatializations do not guarantee it. An overconfident army officer, sent to ''suppress'' the Aborigines, relies upon a map upon which the plan to ''dispense justice'' looks simple, for ''the map was correct, and there was no arguing with the captain's logic, the elegance of the pincer-movement and the human chain.'' 55 Yet the map's inability to divulge the density of the brush and the skills of the Aborigines has disastrous consequences for the military sortie. The settlers themselves are thus empowered to use force to expel Aborigines who ''trespass.'' A group of settlers takes this as carte blanche, following the spearing of another violent settler, and in a climactic moment, attacks and kills the members of an Aboriginal settlement. Other ''trespassers'' are cleansed from the spaces of property through sexual violence and rat poison. The cuts of property, ultimately, become more than metaphoric. While Thornhill feels some remorse, this is fleeting. Property's logic of severability, it seems, produces an ethic of dehumanization. Its territorialization constitute others as trespassers, rather than cohabitants. The territories of property, in these senses, are not simply an outcome of colonial dispossession, but a precondition.
III. The emplacement of property
I have argued that the spatialization of property and its associated territorial form entails a series of cuts. Maps, grids, visualizations and signifiers, such as fences and huts, are its currency. But as we have seen, such enactments do not necessarily work in straightforward ways. The cuts are provisional, at best. The cadastral grid hangs loosely upon the land. Its governmental effects do not materialize, or are contested by other, prior geographies of possession, reliant less on boundary and stasis than on flow and line. 56 Territory is a basis for division and annihilation, or engagement and recognition. But such cuts also have an important and sometimes ambivalent relation to the place in which they unfold.
Property's boundaries, we have seen, rely upon a logic of severability. Subjects and objects must be detached from their contexts. This may entail the remaking of particular places, in which localized socionatures are reworked, often violently, with the inauguration of new property regimes. The inauguration, for example, of capitalist property relations in England saw processes of displacement, in the sense that the creation of more abstract and transferable models of property required the hacking away of localized conceptions of landed property, entangled with local custom and emplaced social relationships. 57 Similarly, the remaking of property relations in colonial contexts clearly entails powerful (and ongoing) processes of displacement, whereby indigenous peoples are wrenched from their local life-worlds. However, the making and remaking of place, again, must be viewed as conditional achievements, dependent on continuous practice. Colonial displacement, for example, entails not only individual acts of expulsion, but also sustained and continuing acts of forgetting.
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Colliding narratives of property and place may be present in struggles in gentrifying neighborhoods, in which developers represent space as empty and pulverized, while local activists struggle to produce accounts of a dense, storied, and valuable place. For property may not only serve as a means by which a place is remade, but also as a powerful vocabulary by which places can be imbued with meaning, even if that means effacing prior memories and emplacements. Property is a means by which we make, as well as re-make, places.
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On the Hawkesbury River, the cuts of property begin a remaking of place, and the associated displacement of the previous occupants and their investments and understandings. For a while, the river is essentially two utterly alien places that scrape uneasily against each other. But in a more sustained sense, the novel describes the recontextualization of property, as the ''cuts'' of property give way to entanglement. For Thornhill and Sal move from thinking of their property as an abstract and alienable parcel to a site full of attachment, memory and association. At the outset, Thornhill craves a space that is his own: at the conclusion, it becomes a place that shapes who he is.
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Both Thornhill and Sal have strong associations to the river landscape of London, a place that is, for Thornhill, ''as intimate to him as breathing.'' 61 When he first encounters the point he lays claim to on the Hawkesbury, he desires it as an object of property through which he can constitute himself, viewing the land as ''… a blank page on which a man might write a new life. '' 62 He persuades a very reluctant Sal of his plan by characterizing the land as an alienable space of investment that will allow them to buy a home in London, from which they can hear ''the Bow Bells telling us the time of day.'' 63 But in time, it becomes clear that the memories of London are fading and becoming diffuse. Thornhill realizes that he now knows the Hawkesbury as well as he knew the Thames.
So it is that, ultimately, Thornhill participates in the massacre in order to hold on to land not as space, but as place. Violence may be an expression of territorial power, but it also reflects emplaced desire. As the threat of violence grows, he considers selling the property, severing the object of property from its subject. But Thornhill realizes that he is unwilling to part with his property ''for nothing more than a few numbers on a piece of paper.'' 64 He has not only scratched his marks upon the surface of the land to signal his title to this parcel; by the end of the novel, he has been indelibly marked by the land, and in so doing, has become emplaced:
He knew his place now … It seemed that he had become another man altogether. Eating the food of this country, drinking its water, breathing its air, had remade him, particle by particle. This sky, those cliffs, that river were no longer the means by which he might return to some other place. This was where he was: not just in body, but in soul as well. 65 And as such, he will kill, and so drive others from land to which they have a clear attachment. Paradoxically, it is violence and death that leads to new life and peace. Thus, it is 60. Paradoxically, the self and the object of property, imagined as bounded and discrete, are mutually entangled. The object itself has meaning only in relation to the subject, as expressed in the legal principle that all things must be assigned a determinate owner (or according to the Hegelian logic that things are not ends in themselves, but derive their ''destiny and soul'' from a person's will). Similarly, the subject is constituted in relation to the object. Either the object is an extension of the labour of the owner, in Lockean terms, or is actualized through a Hegelian extension of the subject's will into the external world and then reappropriated in the form of property. In Thornhill's case, the land takes on added meaning, becoming more than an alienable object, which he can ''cut'' from himself. Ultimately, indeed, his identity is caught up not only in the object of property, but also in the situation of his land in a broader web of localized meaning and association. 61. Op ultimately for the love of his land (''that point of land the shape of his thumb'' 66 ) that Thornhill resorts to violence. The final extirpation of the Aborigines leads, at last, to quiet possession, and allows Thornhill and his family to secure their dream of a settled estate. And yet the novel closes on a melancholy note: what should feel like triumph is presented as a subtle mixture of guilt, loss and loneliness. As Thornhill gazes on the forests beyond his estate, from behind his walls and fences, he is the archetypical liberal owner -secure and self-sufficient, yet utterly alone. True to property's imperative, he has constituted himself and the object of his property through forms of severance and detachment. Yet as he gazes upon the forest from afar, he yearns for a glimpse of his former Aboriginal neighbours.
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IV. Conclusions
Liberal property relies upon, I have argued, a particular process of spatialization, where subject and object must be detached and individuated. Imagined as spaces, property becomes territorialized, necessitating a remaking of locally emplaced networks of connection and relationality. But to turn property into a space is no easy task. The spaces of property remain entangled and situated. Similarly, Thornhill is torn between an ethic of connection and a logic of pulverization. He constitutes himself and his property as discrete, autonomous spaces, yet such spaces are constantly being hybridized and reworked. He imagines the land as his, but is forced to confront the presence of others, and ultimately to enforce his claim against them.
Obviously, there are problems in using a fictional account of localized colonization, set two hundred years ago, as a basis for a more general treatment of property and space. I do not claim, of course, to use the novel as ''data,'' but rather as a suggestive basis for some exploratory and provisional claims, that resonates with other work I have done on property. Further reflection is needed on the relevance of cuts and flows to the makings of property more generally.
In so doing, I think, we begin to cast light on the particularly important relationship between property and space. It is tempting in law to overlook space, or to treat it simply as a surface upon which other more interesting dynamics unfold, 68 given the prevalence of a particular view of space as inert, transparent, pre-political, and passive. 69 To say that property has a geographic dimension is, in this sense, to state the obvious. From this perspective, the creation of a property regime entails the drawing of lines, the delineation of spaces, and the making of territories. But such spaces too often appear, if considered at all, to be simply an outcome of law. Space is a surface upon which law unfolds. Thus, we might think of colonial dispossession or early modern enclosure as a form of spatial re-inscription. Space gets rearranged through property, but is itself inert.
But I have tried to argue here that geography has a more fundamental relationship to property, providing a categorical logic by which subjects and objects are constituted. In modern, liberal formulations, both are treated as if they were spaces: bounded, named, secure, and detached. Property, moreover, must be materialized in particular configurations if it is to be more than an abstraction. In so doing, as we have noted, other spacessuch as territories and places -are put to work. But such materializations also implicate others -whether beings or things -who by their presence, practices, and flux, may complicate such sharp spatializations. I have tried to argue here that property itself is, in many senses a form of geography, engaged in a consequential production and parsing of space, negotiating networks of flow and relationality.
Second, such geographies lead us inexorably to power. Ideologies and practices of property are shaped by the workings of property's cuts and flows. Property's logic of severance surely shapes ''property consciousness,'' creating an ethic of inter-subjective separability, ordered with reference to boundaries. This helps to us imagine property as a space of individual autonomy, detached from broader ethical and practical entanglements. The territorialization of property, as has been noted, is more than an outcome of power, but a means by which power is exercised and mobilized. 70 Yet these very spatializations and territorializations also serves to de-politicize property, deflecting attention from relations between people to relations between people and apparently inert spaces. Space hides things from us. Similarly, territory appears to govern, rather than people. For all these reasons, the geographies of property cannot be thought of as simply a rather obvious outcome of more significant processes.
